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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a branch of modern mathematic and decision making theory. Its aim is to study conflict situations, where players' interests are collided. Mostly we see such situations in every field of human activities and that is why it is often used. A mathematical model of conflict situation is called a game. Thus, game theory is a mathematical decision theory in conflict situations. Such game's main task is not to describe a conflict, but the solutions by making compromise decisions.
In that case when we construct a mathematical model of conflict and define principle of optimality, or a principle of making optimal decision, we get a mathematical problem that should be solved by mathematical methods.
In classical game theory the main basic model of a conflict is a no cooperative game that is defined by a system *Corresponding author.
where } ,..., 2 , 1 { n N  is a set of players, is N i  player's real-valued payoff (utility) function, he tries to maximize it. In  game players choose their strategies simultaneously and independently they do not inform each other about it. This way we get a situation X x x x x n   ) ,..., , ( 2 1 , where
Therefore  game is called noncooperative. Here players' strategic behaviours are studied or such strategies by using them they get this or that kind of guaranteed payoffs (utilities). Thus, the problem is to find such X x  * situation, that by the given principle of optimality, will be a solution of a multicriterion )) ( ),...,
In a classical theory of cooperative games players' cooperative behaviours are studied in conditions of  game. Players can enrol in coalitions and each member of a coalition can discuss about choosing their strategies in accord. In addition to this in coalition players can combine -sum their payoffs and then imputate. Moreover, players' utilities have got a transferring property, or payoffs are measured by unital scale, and they can transfer from one player to another without loosing and limitation.
In order to describe such games a characteristic function of  game is used. 
For a simplification we call v a cooperative game.
A cooperative v game's aim is an imputation of ) (N v maximal guaranteed common payoff among the players: [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] and note by
If we define L  game's characteristic function (a lexicographic cooperative game) analogically to the classical cooperative game, there will be additional difficulties connected to the existence of a characteristic function, imputation, C-core and e.t.c [10, 11] . The presented article is dedicated to the problem of the existence of Neumann-Morgenstern's solutions in lexicographic games. The obtained main results are given in the II and the III sections. In the II section the main definitions are given related to lexicographic cooperative game 12 ( , ,..., )
In such game the imputation of the payoff are presented by the form of a matrix. In lexicographic cooperative games the existence of Neumann-Morgenstern's solutions is related to the existence of C-core ) (v C . Therefore C-core of a lexicographic cooperative game's v is defined and the conditions are proved, whereas the set of imputation is Ccore (Theorem 1). Perhaps C-core ) (v C will be an empty set (Example 1). Its structure in certain conditions is established (Theorem 2). In the III section NeumannMorgenstern's solution ) (v NM is defined as a set of a stable imputation. Theorem 3 is proved that gives the sufficient conditions for the existing nonempty set of the stable solutions ) (v NM in a lexicographic cooperative game and it can be coincided to C-core ) (v C . By theorem 4 the necessary conditions of the existence of the stable solutions is proved. The proved theorems 3 and 4 give us the opportunity to establish its form in the case of their existence. Section IV is conclusion of research. 
II. LEXICOGRAPHIC COOPERATIVE GAME AND ITS
[11]. The second condition is a lexicographically-Lsuper-additivity property.
Let write a lexicographic cooperative game v by means of scalar functions
we write it a form of matrix. 
For which fulfills the following conditions
It is obvious that according to ) (v E , and the projection of this set on ) (
At the same time note that 
As well as in a classical cooperative game, in a lexicographic cooperative v game ideal variant also would be finding such kind of imputation, that would be belonged to C-core and would dominate over all other imputation. J.von Neumann and O. Morgenstern defined the solutions of a cooperative game as subsets of a set of imputations, they perform a ideal role of imputations. Let introduce a concept of such solution for a lexicographic cooperative game and establish some of its properties.
At first, define
game's C-core and show that conditions C-core's imputations must by satisfied.
Definition 1. The set of all undominated imputations for a game
Thus, it is proved that if
follows from the last inequality that 
and also
Thus, it is proved that if for any
. The theorem is proved. It follows from the theorem that if

, where: 
Proof. It is obvious that
Therefore it is sufficient to check that if
By virtue of the theorem 1 the condition ) ( Neumann-Morgenstern's solutions of a cooperative game is not possible to be used into practice. The concept of this solution has got a philosophic sense, that was explored by N.N. Vorob'ev: -it is a certain norm of a stable behaviour which is characteristic for a given social structure‖ [13] . Mathematics is universally accepted as mother of all science and it is in nature and in every fabric of life [14] . Game theory is a field of a modern mathematics which studies the norms of a human being's behavior in the process of economic, social, political and everyday relationships. Therefore, if we take NeumannMorgenstern's norm of behavior in a game, then the payoffs imputation characterises player's practical skills. Therefore this concept will be spread by using it in the case of a lexicographic game, because in such games we are having situations in the case of strictly ranked criterion. Some other applications of lexicographic games are studied in [15, 16] (18) and note
III. NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN'S SOLUTION OF A LEXICOGRAPHIC COOPERATIVE GAME'S
The 
It is obvious that
Let note .
(23)
Let define the set
)} ( ) ( X so that the following conditions will be fulfilled
By virtue of (20) for
we can choose
It is obvious, that
and X is an imputation from . X , for them the following relations will be fulfilled
33)
Let choose for 
we have the following equality.
Proof. Let suppose that for any Let take such
Let check up that 
IV. CONCLUSION
In the process of defining a lexicographic cooperative game and discussing its principles of optimality, some difficulties are put forward, connected to the existence of a characteristic function, imputation, C-core. The more so, such difficulties were expected in lexicographic cooperative games, connected to the definition of Neumann-Morgenstern's solutions and its existence. In the proved theorems there are necessary and sufficient conditions of the existence of Neumann-Morgenstern's solutions. The proved theorems gives us the opportunity to establish its form in the case of their existence.
